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From the literature

Innovating means accepting a risk the market struggles to insure

A company wants to develop a new technology. The project looks promising. But nobody can guarantee that it will work. Who should bear the risk?

For Kenneth Arrow, this question lies at the heart of the economics of innovation.

In his 1962 article, he begins by imagining a theoretical world in which it would be possible to enter into contracts covering every conceivable future event.

In such a world, risk could be allocated among those willing to bear it.

Our real economy obviously works differently.

Markets for transferring risk do exist, but they are incomplete. Insurance, financial markets and diversification can absorb part of it. They cannot make the uncertainty inherent in innovation disappear.

Can the failure of an innovation be insured?

Let us imagine a very particular kind of insurance.

A company invests five million euros to develop a technology. The insurer promises to reimburse the full amount if the project fails.

The problem is immediately apparent.

If the company no longer bears any consequence of failure, its behaviour may change.

It may put less effort into the project. It may choose its expenditure less rigorously. It may take more risks.

Arrow relates this phenomenon to what economists call the problem of moral hazard.

The outcome of an innovative project depends both on genuinely uncertain circumstances and on the decisions of those running the project.

It is extremely difficult to separate the two.

Sharing risk without removing incentives

Here we find a dilemma that still exists in innovation funding.

If the company bears all the risk, some desirable projects will never be undertaken.

If an outside funder bears all the risk, the company's incentives may be altered.

The risk therefore has to be shared.

Arrow refers in particular to the principle of co-insurance: part of the risk is transferred, while another part remains with the party concerned.

This insight helps explain many contemporary mechanisms.

The financing of an innovative project rarely relies on a single source.

The company contributes equity. Investors may come in. A bank may finance certain expenditure. A public scheme may cover another part of the project.

The company thus retains a direct economic interest in success, while the overall risk is distributed.

Why the riskiest projects may be underfunded

If risk transfer mechanisms are imperfect, a consequence follows.

Highly uncertain activities are likely to receive less capital than they should.

Arrow says so explicitly: underinvestment in risky activities is to be expected.

And research and innovation belong precisely to this category.

This also helps explain a common paradox.

A project can have considerable potential and be extremely difficult to finance.

There is no contradiction.

Potential concerns what will happen in the event of success. Financing also depends on what may happen before getting there.

So the question is not only one of return

When a company builds its financing plan, it often reasons in terms of cost. Which source of financing is the cheapest?

But for an innovative activity, a second variable is just as important: who bears which risk?

A grant, a repayable advance, equity and bank debt do not have the same characteristics.

They do not allocate risk between the company and its funders in the same way.

The right financing structure is therefore not necessarily the one that brings in the cheapest money.

It is the one that properly organises the sharing of risk as the project develops.

What this changes for a company

This leads to asking financing questions in a different order.

First, what are the project's main uncertainties? Next, how much does it cost to resolve them? When will new information become available? Finally, which source of financing suits each level of risk?

A very early-stage research programme is not necessarily financed in the same way as an industrialisation phase whose main technological uncertainties have already been resolved.

The structure of the financing should evolve with the structure of the risk.

Financing innovation is not simply a matter of providing capital. It is a matter of organising how an uncertainty is shared.

Main reference: Kenneth J. Arrow (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton University Press / NBER, pp. 609-626. The economic reasoning is attributed to Kenneth Arrow. The parallels drawn with contemporary public funding and CHOICE's work are an editorial perspective.