Why the market does not spontaneously fund all useful innovation
Why are there so many public schemes designed to fund research, innovation and technological development?
The most immediate answer is often that the State wishes to support innovation. That is true, but insufficient.
A more interesting question is why innovation should need specific support at all.
In 1962, Kenneth Arrow gave a particularly powerful answer in Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention.
His starting point is that of classical economic theory. Under certain conditions, a competitive market allows resources to be allocated efficiently.
But innovation fits these conditions poorly.
Arrow identifies three fundamental difficulties: uncertainty, the impossibility of fully appropriating the results of innovation, and the indivisibilities linked to information.
A market economy tends to invest less in research and innovation than would be desirable from society's point of view.
Innovation is not an investment like any other
Buying a machine that is already available is relatively simple.
The company knows its price. It knows its specifications. It can reasonably estimate what it will produce.
Research works differently.
When a company starts an R&D programme, it does not know exactly what result it will obtain. The project may succeed. It may fail. It may also produce a result completely different from the one originally sought.
For Arrow, this uncertainty is not an accident.
It is inherent in inventive activity.
If the result were known in advance, it would no longer truly be a matter of producing new knowledge.
The information problem
There is a second peculiarity.
The output of research is, at least in part, information.
A company may spend several million euros to discover a new method, a process or a scientific property.
But once this knowledge has been produced, its use by one more company may sometimes cost almost nothing.
This brings us to a paradox.
From society's point of view, existing knowledge should be widely used, since it can generate new economic benefits.
From the point of view of the company that paid for its discovery, on the contrary, it must be possible to retain part of its value.
Otherwise, why bear the cost and the risk of research?
Creating value without being able to capture all of it
This is probably one of the most important ideas in Arrow's text.
An innovation can create more value for the economy than revenue for whoever produced it.
Competitors may draw inspiration from it. Suppliers may make progress. Employees may spread knowledge. Other researchers may use the results to develop new technologies.
Part of this value therefore necessarily escapes the company that financed the initial project.
It then becomes perfectly rational for a company not to finance certain projects, even though they are useful to the economy as a whole.
The problem is not that the company is reasoning badly.
It is reasoning precisely on the basis of the benefits it can hope to capture.
This is where public funding for innovation begins
This analysis offers a different way of looking at public support for R&D.
An innovation grant is not necessarily a reward given to a particularly deserving company.
It can be understood as a mechanism designed to correct a gap between two values: the value the project can create for the company; and the value it can create for the economy and for society.
When the second is significantly greater than the first, the market may tend to underfund the project.
Public intervention then has an economic justification.
What this changes for an innovative company
This reading also changes the way a project is presented when seeking public funding.
It is not enough to show that the project can be profitable.
You need to understand what justifies sharing part of the risk.
What new knowledge will be produced? Which uncertainties need to be resolved? Which benefits will potentially extend beyond the company's boundaries? Which subsequent developments can the project make possible?
The question of public funding then becomes far more interesting.
It is no longer simply a matter of asking: "How much can we get?"
It is first a matter of understanding: "Why does this project deserve to have its risk shared?"
This is exactly where Arrow's economic analysis, more than sixty years after its publication, remains remarkably relevant.
Main reference: Kenneth J. Arrow (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton University Press / NBER, pp. 609-626. The economic reasoning is attributed to Kenneth Arrow. The parallels drawn with contemporary public funding and CHOICE's work are an editorial perspective.