Monopoly or competition: who really has an incentive to innovate?
A highly profitable company has plenty of money. It should therefore naturally have a stronger incentive to innovate. The intuition seems reasonable. Yet Kenneth Arrow shows that it can be misleading.
In a famous section of his article, he compares the incentive to adopt a cost-reducing innovation under competition and under monopoly.
His conclusion is counter-intuitive: under certain assumptions, the incentive to innovate may be weaker for the monopolist.
Why?
The reason lies in something the dominant firm already has: its profits.
Let us imagine a company that enjoys a monopoly position.
Even before the innovation appears, it is already earning a substantial margin.
If it introduces a new technology, it therefore does not gain the full value created.
Part of that value simply replaces a rent it already had.
Conversely, a new entrant or an inventor operating in a competitive environment may see innovation as the means of creating an advantage it did not previously have.
Arrow shows formally that profits already earned before the innovation can thus reduce the marginal incentive to innovate.
Radical innovation poses another problem
Arrow goes further.
Even in a competitive environment, the innovator does not necessarily capture all the social value created.
If an innovation sharply reduces costs, part of the benefit may be captured by consumers in the form of lower prices.
For society, this is obviously positive.
For the inventor deciding whether or not to bear the costs of research, it creates a problem.
The private benefit of innovation may be lower than its social benefit.
Once again, the company's rational decision may therefore produce less innovation than would be socially desirable.
Public funding therefore does not only make up for financial market failure
This distinction is important.
One might think that public support steps in only when a company cannot find an investor or a bank.
Arrow's analysis goes deeper.
Even with perfectly functioning financial markets, some innovations could remain underfunded if the company cannot capture a sufficient share of the value they create.
The problem therefore does not stem solely from access to capital.
It also stems from the gap between private return and social return.
An interesting question for highly innovative projects
When a company develops a major innovation, it is naturally asked what revenue it will be able to generate.
The question is legitimate. But it measures only part of the impact.
An innovation can also:
- reduce costs for other players
- improve the productivity of an industry
- give rise to new applications
- produce reusable knowledge
- create standards or technological infrastructure.
The justification for public funding often lies precisely in this gap between the value the company will be able to capture and the value the project will be able to create more broadly.
The key idea
A player's financial capacity and its economic incentive to innovate are two different things.
A company may have the necessary resources and yet have no interest in financing alone an innovation whose benefits will largely be captured elsewhere.
Conversely, a small company may have a very strong incentive to innovate but lack the resources to bear the risk.
Financing innovation must therefore bring together the capacity to finance, the level of risk and the future distribution of the value created.
Main reference: Kenneth J. Arrow (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton University Press / NBER, pp. 609-626. The economic reasoning is attributed to Kenneth Arrow. The parallels drawn with contemporary public funding and CHOICE's work are an editorial perspective.