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From the literature

Why the State funds R&D without being able to know the outcome in advance

Suppose Kenneth Arrow is right. The market tends to underfund certain research activities. The solution seems obvious. The State must fund more R&D. Problem solved? Not really.

Arrow devotes the end of his article to a second difficulty.

If a public institution is to make up for insufficient private investment, how does it know how much to invest? And above all, how does it choose the projects?

Changing funder does not remove uncertainty

A public administration knows no more about the future than a company does.

It cannot know for certain which research will lead to a major innovation.

It cannot calculate precisely the future return on each programme.

The problem that prevented the market from funding innovation perfectly therefore does not disappear when the funding becomes public.

Uncertainty remains.

Public funding is a response to the problem. At the same time, it creates a new decision problem.

How to select?

Arrow also stresses how difficult it is to determine the efficient use of public resources earmarked for research.

If payment depends solely on the final result, the researcher or the company bears considerable risk.

If all costs are reimbursed regardless of the result, the incentives for efficiency may weaken.

We are back to the dilemma encountered earlier.

Risk has to be shared without removing incentives.

Arrow analyses in particular "cost plus" contracts, in which costs are covered and an additional fee is paid to the contractor.

These mechanisms reduce the risk borne by whoever carries out the project, but can have undesirable effects on costs and behaviour.

Public funding is therefore an engineering problem

It is not enough to decide that a project deserves public money.

The mechanism has to be designed.

What share of the costs should be covered? What share should remain with the company? Which intermediate results should be checked? At what point should the decision to continue be taken? How much freedom should the project holder be given? How can competition between several solutions be preserved?

These questions are still at the heart of modern innovation funding mechanisms.

Evaluation is not about predicting the future

This is probably one of the most common misunderstandings.

When a committee examines an innovative project, one might think it has to determine whether the project will succeed.

That would be an impossible task.

A rational evaluation seeks rather to determine whether the risk is worth taking.

The question is therefore not: "Will this project succeed?"

It becomes: "Given the information available today, is it reasonable to fund the next stage?"

This nuance changes everything.

What this changes for a funding application

A company should not try to artificially turn its innovative project into a certainty.

Evaluators know that risks exist.

Hiding them may even undermine the credibility of the application.

It is often far more convincing to explain clearly:

  • what has already been demonstrated
  • what remains uncertain
  • how these uncertainties will be tested
  • which criteria will be used to decide on the next steps.

A good innovation project does not promise that the future is known. It shows how it will produce the information needed to make progressively better decisions.

Main reference: Kenneth J. Arrow (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton University Press / NBER, pp. 609-626. The economic reasoning is attributed to Kenneth Arrow. The parallels drawn with contemporary public funding and CHOICE's work are an editorial perspective.